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 Introduction 
The purpose of this article is to examine the changes which have been taking 
place in collective bargaining in Spain. During the last years, the discussion has fo-
cused on two key points: the first concerns the structure of collective bargaining and 
the second, its contents. 
 On the one hand, the discussion among social partners has oscillated between 
decentralisation and centralisation in the structure of this collective bargaining. 
Several analysts point out that the current mixed structure impedes the fight 
against inflation and unemployment, whereas other analysts point out that, after 
labour reforms in the 90s, there has been a gradual transformation. The structure 
of collective bargaining reflects a capacity to adapt to the requirements of indi-
vidual companies, as well as to guarantee working conditions, as trade unions 
claim. 
 On the other hand, the content of collective agreements has widened with labour 
reforms giving rise to a new qualitative agenda in bargaining. 
The concept of collective bargaining used in this article is a broad one. We un-
derstand as collective bargaining all agreements reached at different levels of indus-
trial relations. Consequently, at highest level, we consider social concertation as an 
agreement of political exchange between social partners. At medium level, we more 
strictly consider the sectoral, territorial and company collective agreements. And fi-
nally, we also consider as collective bargaining the agreements at the company and 
workplace levels which are not legally registered. Territorial pacts, which are usually 
defined as middle-level concertation, are not included here owing to space. 
This broad concept of collective bargaining allows us to follow the theme exam-
ined in this special issue of the review. This theme is addressed at four points from a 
comparative perspective. They are: the influence of the recent legal changes; the 
socio-economic consequences of bargaining; the articulation of bargaining levels and 
their legitimacy and the extent of their coverage: 
1. First, the impact of legal changes in industrial relations. In our view, the labour 
reforms of 1994 and 1997 helped to rationalize the structure of collective bar-
gaining. Basically, they encouraged a dual process which simultaneously lead to 
decentralisation at company level and to centralisation at the sectoral and territo-
rial levels. Both processes, although contradictory at first sight, are also com-
plementary to a certain degree. 
2. Secondly, collective bargaining has had socio-economic consequences espe-
cially shown in the control of inflation during the 80s through social concerta-
tion. Besides, its economic function, this concertation also had an important po-
litical function in the transition to democracy. In the 90s, pay restraint, which, 
from then on, would be only carried out by means of collective agreements, also 
allowed a moderate wage growth to be compatible with employment creation.  
3. Third, the relationship between the different levels and their articulation has 
been a problem since the 70s. Despite the labour reforms just mentioned, the 
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structure is still fragmented into sectoral, sectoral-provincial, regional, local and 
company levels. However, labour reforms in the 90s promoted more rationalisa-
tion in the structure of collective bargaining which at the same time gradually 
contributed to the improvement of its legitimacy. 
4. And, fourth, the coverage of collective bargaining a wide, although its effective-
ness in small-sized companies is doubtful. The dual process of centralisation and 
decentralisation seems to help adapt bargaining to the specific situations of sec-
tors and of companies. Meanwhile, enlargement of its content is encouraging an 
increasing dialogue on flexibility and labour security. The moves to increase 
flexibility of working time has contributed to bargaining over annual working 
time, the extension of irregular working time, shift work and reduction of over-
time, and, at the same time, in compensation, there is transformation of tempo-
rary into permanent employment. 
The examination of these four points constituting the thread of the article will be 
carried out through an analysis in the following four sections in which we will deal. 
First, we give a brief theoretical framework of the debate in comparative perspective 
with Europe.  Second, , we examine the structure of collective bargaining, the prob-
lems related to its fragmentation and control as well as the positions of parties in the 
present debate. Third, we examine changes in the content of collective bargaining, the 
enrichment of the bargaining agenda with new clauses in collective agreements in 
which employment, security and flexibility are of increasing importance. Finally, , we  
assess the consequences of the reform of collective bargaining and the most important 
analyses related to it. 
1  Brief theoretical outline of the debate in Spain in comparative perspective 
The debate between the supporters of centralisation and of decentralisation fol-
lows a similar pattern to that in the European Union. For some analysts, the model of 
collective bargaining in Spain is not a decentralised one, such as that in Britain, nei-
ther is it a centralised one, as in the Scandinavian countries. According to some ana-
lysts (e.g. Bentolila/Jimeno 2001), the mixed structure of the Spanish collective bar-
gaining would be the worst in terms of adjustment and adaptation to changes in the 
business cycle. On the one hand, the advantage of the decentralised model of collec-
tive bargaining lies in its capacity to adjust more swiftly at company level to varia-
tions in the environment. This would enable a micro-economic orientation of social 
partners. On the other hand, centralised bargaining has other advantages such as 
alignment of wage behaviour with the objectives of macro-economic policy. Both ex-
treme models, represented by an inverted ‘U’, would give  better results when fight-
ing unemployment and inflation (Calmfors/Driffil 1988; Paloheimo 1993).  
However, as Traxler (2003) points out, the debate around new corporatism and 
especially between centralisation and decentralisation might not sufficiently show the 
real nature of the theoretical problem. Clues to this may be found in the degree of 
vertical and horizontal articulation of collective bargaining. In the first case, vertical 
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articulation covers from the territorial, sectoral, and company levels. In the second 
case, horizontal articulation refers to intersectoral co-ordination. The degree of articu-
lation is directly related to the governability of industrial relations. In the Spanish 
case, the problems are found in the lack of articulation and co-ordination of collective 
bargaining. Other problems must be added, such as the low rate of union membership 
(15,1%, Waddington/Hoffman 2000). Apart from this, fragmentation of union organi-
sations, the „parallel” unionism of workers’ committees and the informal nature of 
industrial relations in small firms must be considered. Although all of this makes it 
difficult to manage and articulate the different levels of collective bargaining, surpris-
ingly, its influence on the inflation has not been determinant as it may be first theo-
retically supposed. Actually, no centralised concertation on wages has been reported 
in the 90s but, in spite of this fact, wages have been showing a moderate evolution 
(see table 1). Likewise, wages in companies with a company agreement have not de-
viated much from the agreements at the sectoral level, as it might have been expected 
as a result of decentralisation. One possible explanation seems to have been the slow-
ing of inflation in the 90s which resulted in a lower demand for wage increases by un-
ions and workers’ committees. How can we explain that despite the lack of articula-
tion in collective bargaining, inflation has remained low and it has been possible to 
contain wage growth? 
One possible explanation lies in the harmonising effect of the „erga omnes” 
clauses extending the coverage of collective agreements and particularly in the be-
haviour of wage patterns. Unity of action by the two largest unions (CCOO and UGT 
delegates represent 74% of the members in the Workers’ Committees, Jódar/Jordana 
1999) is also to be considered. Also moving of union attention to other issues, such as 
flexibility in temporary employment contracts and flexibility in working time. The 
„erga omnes” extension clauses are the most important element in the harmonising 
process since they enable the extension of wage increase and other agreed employ-
ment conditions to all companies and workers in the same sectoral and territorial 
units defined by the collective agreement. For instance, we may observe that the im-
portant sectors, as far as number of workers is concerned, are ruled by a single 
agreement agreed at national level (such as the chemical industry, textile, building, 
finances and insurances). Concerning the unity of action, the two main unions yearly 
establish the goals and criteria for joint action in order to guide collective bargaining 
which circumscribes the scope for wage demands when negotiating lower level col-
lective agreements. As for flexibility in temporary contracting, we have to mention 
that is has become one of the main concerns of unions since the 80s together as a re-
sult of increased unemployment. We have just to remember that from the 90s one out 
of three employees has a temporary contract. The tough reality of employment pre-
carity affects the union agendas up to the point that employment security has become 
the most important priority. And in the 90s working time flexibility was also intro-
duced onto the agenda of collective bargaining with the consequences on employ-
ment quality as it will be discussed later. 
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Tab 1.  Inflation and pay increase agreed by collective agreement, 1985-2000  
(Source: Ministerio de Trabajo y Seguridad Social, Estadísticas de convenios colectivos. 
IPC data, source: Instituto Nacional de Estadística. Mentioned in the ‘Memoria sobre la si-
tuación socioeconómica y laboral.’ Consejo Económico y Social, Madrid: 2002: 376) 
Years 
 
Pay increase (1)   
(with safeguard 
clause), 
Real IPC (con-
sumer price in-
dex) yearly aver-
age (2) 
Predicted IPC Increase pur-
chasing power 
(1-2) 
1985 7,9 8,8 7,0 - 0,9 
1986 8,2 8,8 8,0 - 0,6 
1987 6,5 5,2 5,0 1,3 
1988 6,4 4,8 3,0 1,5 
1989 7,8 6,8 3,0 1,0 
1990 8,3 6,7 5,7 1,6 
1991 8,0 5,9 5,0 2,1 
1992 7,3 5,9 5,0 1,4 
1993 5,5 4,6 4,5 0,9 
1994 3,6 4,7 3,5 -1,1 
1995 3,9 4,7 3,5 - 0,8 
1996 3,8 3,6 3,5 - 0,2 
1997 2,9 2,0 2,2 0,9 
1998 2,6 1,8 2,1 0,8 
1999 2,7 2,3 1,8 0,4 
2000 3,7 3,4 2,0 0,3 
2001 3,6 3,6 2,8 0,0 
 
In short, the two first mentioned effects, „erga omnes” clauses and union unity 
of action are a power influence on the expansion of similar patterns for agreements at 
different levels. This facilitates the governability of collective bargaining despite the 
complexity and fragmented nature of its structure in Spain. In contrast, issues related 
to labour flexibility have tended to weaken the unions (such as low membership) and 
at the same time they have changed the priorities in the union agendas which have, 
without doubt, contributed to moderating wage demands. 
Another very different issue is wage dispersion. The mixed structure of collec-
tive bargaining may also influence the wage dispersion but this is hard to establish in 
view of the lack of adequate data sources. 
2.  The structure of collective bargaining 
As for the structure of collective bargaining, one important characteristic is the 
presence of agreements at different levels, such as workplace, company or above-
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company ones, which vary as to their territorial coverage: local, regional, provincial, 
inter-provincial, of autonomous community, of different autonomous communities, 
and state. Legal regulation of collective agreements also gives the social partners the 
right to define the territorial, personal, functional scope of their agreements (Fina et 
al. 2001). This is to say, an employers’ organisation and a trade union may freely 
agree to create a bargaining unit for a particular geographical area and an sub-sector 
of economic activity provided that these organisations have the required degree of 
representativeness for collective bargaining. 
The problems of governing the structure of collective agreements was also a 
matter of concern in the National Inter-Industry Framework Agreement, Acuerdo 
Marco Interconfederal, of 1980 in which the signatories (UGT and CEOE) noted the 
extreme diversity of contracting units. Their structure is characterized by decentrali-
sation, fragmentation and lack or articulation so they acknowledged the need to re-
duce the number of units in order to reduce „redundant social conflict”. With this 
purpose, in the Agreement, the parties made public their intention to promote an ar-
ticulated bargaining system starting with the sectoral units which would determine 
the issues to be transferred to the lower-level units. Some years later, in 1985, in the 
Economic and Social Agreement, Acuerdo Social y Económico, the same partners, 
and also the Government, again expressed the need to  rationalise the structure of col-
lective bargaining, which they considered to be too fragmented and the signatories 
committed themselves to promote the concentration of workplace agreements in order 
to set the company as the lowest level. So, there was recognition that the structure of 
collective bargaining was fragmented (Ruesga 1991: 390; Miguélez/Rebollo 1999: 
333). 
In general, we may say that in the early 80s, both UGT and CEOE agreed in 
their proposals for rationalisation of the structure of collective bargaining which had 
to be done by giving a more prominent role to the sectoral and national collective 
agreements, enabling an articulation with bargaining at lower levels. For both organi-
sations, centralisation of collective bargaining is necessary in order to control indus-
trial relations: union and employer confederations should have a prominent role in 
defining working conditions. As far as the Government is concerned, they shared 
these judgements but they add other considerations: the structure of collective bar-
gaining in Spain is the worst possible one due to its negative effects on inflation and 
unemployment. Centralisation of collective bargaining would enable it to respond to 
the important problems in the country provided that it is led by the most representa-
tive employer and union organisations that are sensitive to these issues.  
During 90s, difficulties in the reform lead the actors to adopt new strategies. The 
Government and the employers’ organisations started to consider the disadvantages 
of a rigid structure of collective bargaining, one not suitable for the never-ending 
transformations required by the companies. Labour reforms of 1994 aimed specifi-
cally at eliminating rigidities in defining employment conditions, giving more pre-
eminence to decentralised bargaining and recognising, for the first time, company 
agreements in a legal text as a more flexible bargaining level than higher level collec-
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tive agreements, and, at the same time, more scope to employers’ decisions, espe-
cially in matters concerning workers’ mobility.  
In 1997, under the new conservative government of the Partido Popular (needing 
social legitimacy), the unions (CCOO and UGT) and employers’ organisation 
(CEOE) signed the Inter-industry Agreement on Collective Bargaining, Acuerdo In-
terconfederal para la Negociación Colectiva (AINC), and the Inter-industry Agree-
ment for Coverage of Legal Voids, Acuerdo Interconfederal para la Cobertura de 
Vacios (AICV). In the first, after noting the disadvantages of the present structure of 
collective agreements, the signatories  committed themselves to rationalise and reor-
ganise its structure, designing a model in which the issues to be regulated in each of 
the corresponding levels or bargaining units were established. However, implementa-
tion was left to the parties negotiating in each sectoral unit. As it is stated by Del Rey 
et al. (1998: 28), in the AINC the parties showed unquestionable centralising prefer-
ences, especially at state level, compared with the stated objective of decentralisation 
of bargaining deriving from the legislative reform in 1994. In the model designed by 
the AINC, the guidelines were set out for the issues to be reserved to the state and 
sectoral agreement, the issues to be developed subsequently by the lower levels and 
the ones which would be transferred or not to lower levels. According to that agree-
ment, the signatory organisations had to set up a joint commission which, however, 
has not followed these commitments. Regarding the AICV, the unions and employ-
ers’ organisations signing the agreement regulated working conditions in the sectors 
which had hitherto lacked a collective agreement. 
2.1 The current debate between social partners  
Four years later, with the expiry of the AINC and the meagre results obtained, 
the Government strongly pressed the social partners to reconsider reform of the struc-
ture of collective bargaining. Thus, in June 2001, talks resumed between the CEOE 
and CEPYME on the employers’ side and CCOO and UGT on the unions’ side in or-
der to discuss and agree modifications in the structure of collective bargaining. Al-
though the talks were initially bipartite, they became tripartite when the Government, 
which had already played an important indirect role, joined them. The central purpose 
assumed by all parties in the talks was the need to simplify the structure of collective 
bargaining and reduce the great number of collective agreements in Spain which to-
talled above 5,000. However, reducing the number of collective agreements was un-
derstood differently: although all agreed that the very high number of middle-level 
sectoral agreements (provincial, regional or local) had to be reduced (and even elimi-
nated), the trade unions thought that national-level sectoral agreements should be 
strengthened, and more closely articulated with company agreements, whereas the 
employers wanted to give more flexibility, and a predominant role to company 
agreements and also increase the scope for individual regulation of working condi-
tions. 
On the union side, the CCOO and UGT considered the AINC a good starting 
point for negotiations since reforms about the structure of collective bargaining (bar-
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gaining units), about its articulation and division of issues between the different lev-
els of collective agreements and concurrence. The CCOO and UGT, in a common re-
port (UGT/CCOO 2000), considered that: 
Sectoral collective agreements have to be reinforced to become the chief mecha-
nism for steering and articulating the lower levels of bargaining and leading the nego-
tiation of specialized issues. Strong sectoral collective agreements at national level 
must be used as a shield for workers’ rights and to regulate and to articulate negotia-
tions at lower levels, and especially at company level. The unions took this position 
because of the very large number of small firms in the Spanish economy with less 
than six workers which, according to Spanish law, cannot have employee delegates. 
The general effectiveness of the sectoral collective agreement must be preserved 
so that the system of collective bargaining is not weakened and the industrial rela-
tions are not individualised. 
Allocation of issues to different bargaining levels must be established for each 
sector according to the principle of the autonomy of the parties and the multiple nego-
tiating models in place. Thus, national-level sectoral agreements must determine 
which issues within their jurisdiction require a decentralised treatment, and which is-
sues, such as wage benefits, distribution of working time, special shifts or holidays, 
are better negotiated at company level. 
Collective agreements regulate industrial relations. As a rule, we can only con-
sider replacing one agreement by another, but never its disappearance. Continuity1 is 
a fundamental principle: when an agreement expires, its provisions remain in force 
until a new agreement is reached. Considering the very large number of agreements, 
eliminating them would require the re-opening of bargaining processes without a 
minimal guaranteed right beyond the law itself (Workers’ Statute) which would eas-
ily lead a widespread and fragmented industrial conflict. Collective agreements must 
not be weakened by individual employment contracts. 
In accordance to these four conditions, the trade unions considered it necessary 
to focus the debate around four elements: 
1. Establishing measures to reinforce collective bargaining: the ‘steering column’, 
articulation, redefinition of economic sectors, adaptation of the system to new 
economic activities. 
2. Reaching commitment with employers and trade unions in order to promote ar-
ticulation of collective agreements: specific treatment of the obligation to bar-
gain, reinforcement of the role of joint commissions. 
3. Encouraging collective participation in rights of information and consultation. 
4. Extending coverage to the existing legal voids, this is to say, sectors which are 
not covered by collective agreements. 
                                                          
1  The Workers’ Statute establishes that when a collective agreement expires its contents are to 
be applied until the next bargaining. 
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On the employers’ side, the CEOE and the CEPYME stressed that bargaining 
levels and units are matters to be discussed in the talks. They include also the effec-
tiveness of collective agreements, their concurrence and subsidiarity, validity, provi-
sions for their extension and termination, for entering their coverage and for extend-
ing them, the role and functions of the National Consulting Commission for Collec-
tive Agreements2, Comisión Nacional de Convenios Colectivos. They include also the 
content of collective bargaining, this is to say, the issues regulated by law, by collec-
tive bargaining or by individual agreement. In their documents, CEOE and CEPYME 
establish the following targets to be attained concerning collective agreements: 
 Priority must be given to company agreements since they are the ones better able 
to take account of the economic reality in each unit. 
 Continuity (‘Ultra-activity’)3 must be severely restricted or curtailed. This is to 
say, when a collective agreement expires, all its provisions should be negotiated 
from scratch. 
 Issues agreed in collective agreements at the national-sectoral scope cannot be 
negotiated at lower level. 
 The legal basis must be reduced and more scope be given to negotiation between 
company and workers. Collective bargaining must be the result of the autonomy 
of the parties, hence the unions rejected any attempt to predetermine by law the 
structure of bargaining in different sectors. 
 Considering the inflexibility of sectoral collective agreements, a larger role must 
be given to the decisions taken at company level. Sectoral agreements are not 
suitable tools for problems arising at this level. 
 Despite the predominant role of collective agreements, more scope must be 
given to individual contracts. 
For the Government, reform of collective bargaining has a primary economic 
motive: collective bargaining must help restrain inflation. In order to achieve this, its 
reform must be based on avoiding excessive fragmentation of collective agreements, 
creating real scope for negotiation at company level with formulae that enable ad-
justment to economic conditions and protect employment so that each company can 
adapt to the changing economic situation and to their own needs in a better way. Also 
the reform should seek to mitigate any direct or indirect benefits that may be obtained 
by refusing to negotiate. The Government also proposes to eliminate the automatic 
                                                          
2  The National Consulting Commission for Collective Agreements2, Comisión Nacional de 
Convenios Colectivos, is a tripartite (Government, unions, and managersemployers’ organisa-
tions) commission which has got advising and consulting functions for the parts in the work 
collective bargaining according to the definition of the functional scopes of agreements. Also, 
this Commission must inform in cases of joining and extension in time of a collective agree-
ment before the Labour Authority decides.  
3  According to CEOE (2001), in collective agreements negotiated in 2000, ‘ultraactivity’, this 
is extension in time of an agreement beyond its expiration, has extended, in average, almost in 
eight months. 
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extension of the life of collective agreements (the literally called ‘ultraactivity’), at 
least for some issues, and it is also considering introducing formulae for deferred pay 
in collective agreements, such as collective or company pension plans. With these 
goals, the Government has stressed the need for a better definition of the issues to be 
discussed at each bargaining level, an easier way for the companies to be able to opt 
out of what has been agreed in collective agreements at a higher level and avoid ex-
tending the duration of agreements because one of the parties does not wish to nego-
tiate. 
However, the talks ended without agreement and major differences remained be-
tween the three parties. In contrast, as a way to avoid an industrial conflict, the em-
ployers’ organisations and unions agreed some guidelines for negotiations in 2002 
concerning wages and some procedures for the negotiation of collective agreements. 
This was the ‘Inter-industry Agreement for Collective Bargaining 2002’, Acuerdo In-
terconfederal para la Negociación Colectiva 2002 (ANC-2202), and it was agreed by 
unions CCOO and UGT and employers’ organisations CEOE and CEPYME in De-
cember 2001. 
Nevertheless, trade unions and employers’ organisation have made some pro-
gress in negotiating collective agreements, in the sense that there is an increasing 
number of clauses aimed at ordering and articulating the negotiation in the corre-
sponding sector, following the advice of the AINC (CEOE 2002; CES 2001). How-
ever, in most cases, these clauses merely indicate but they do not bind, and sometimes 
their targets are even the opposite of the ones predicted in the AINC. Thus, some sec-
toral agreements establish that they will be of complementary application for compa-
nies with their own agreements. Other agreements, however, prohibit the negotiation 
of agreements which could conflict with the national sectoral agreement, and they 
commit themselves not to open negotiation on certain issues at lower levels. 
Other agreements include an effective division of issues among the different 
functional units but they have a more marginal character. More often, there are 
agreements which include opt-out clauses, for example concerning the wage system, 
and which transfer these issues to lower levels. There are clauses that transfer issues 
related to certain occupational categories and some aspects of labour contracting to 
lower levels. „In short, not much progress has been made towards the renewal of the 
structure of collective bargaining based on a more coherent articulation between 
agreements which brings to an end the jurisdictional uncertainty created by excessive 
fragmentation. Both, a suitable articulation and a peaceful concurrence of agreements 
must be compatible with, and enable adaptation of what has been agreed at national-
sectoral level with the employers’ needs and the new forms of work organisation”, is 
the conclusion of a report by the Consejo Económico y Social (2001: 375). 
However, despite the continuous problems attributed to the structure of collec-
tive bargaining and procedural rules, we can conclude that changes have taken place 
after the labour reforms in 1994 and 1997. Actually, there have been changes in the 
substantive rules and in the content of collective bargaining which is manifest in the 
expansion of the so-called „special clauses” in collective agreements. 
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3.  New content of collective bargaining   
Following the labour reforms of 1994 (and subsequently with the labour reforms 
resulting from the pacts of April 1997), there has been a gradual introduction of 
qualitative elements in collective bargaining in Spain. This is an important difference 
from the 80s. Then collective bargaining was centred on pay issues and the almost 
automatic reproduction of the legal clauses contained in the Workers’ Statute. With 
these reforms, which brought a decentralisation of the structure and a broadening of 
its contents, collective bargaining developed a new dynamism. 
Other contextual factors also contributed to this dynamism such as the weaker 
inflation pressure in the early 90s, making pay issues less pressing (compared to the 
rising inflation context in the 80s, see table 1). To a certain extent, we may say that 
we are witnessing the emergence of a qualitative agenda in which new bargaining is-
sues are becoming important such as employment, continuing training, labour health 
and developing extra-judicial procedures for dispute solution. However, these new is-
sues remain subordinated to the traditional ones such as pay and working time. In 
short, there has been an evolution in the content of bargaining from the traditional 
agenda and towards the new negotiating agenda. 
3.1 The traditional agenda of negotiation 
We focus on two issues of the traditional agenda of bargaining: pay and working 
time. Although they are longstanding issues, they also have include new clauses in 
response to technological innovation, and the restructuring of work and companies, as 
well as new methods for managing human resources. 
 Pay negotiation 
Wages have always had a predominant role in the traditional bargaining agenda 
although the emphasis and meaning has varied over time. In this sense, two great pe-
riods may be distinguished. 
The first period, from 1975 to 1986, was characterised by the establishment of 
national level pacts of a wide content and in a context of strong inflation. One of the 
priorities in the different pacts was to control inflation through wage moderation. In 
the years of the political transition (1975-77), inflation reached a year-on-year growth 
of almost 30%. Growth in inflation was parallel to loss of employment and increase 
of unemployment. The Moncloa Pacts (1978) introduced an important change in that 
period: they modified pay indexation. Up to then, pay increases were based in the 
past instead of the predicted inflation. Besides, a pay band (20-22%) was established 
inside which wage increases might be negotiated. Thus, an important change was in-
troduced in the fight against inflation. Likewise, these pacts had a remarkable politi-
cal importance in promoting the consensus needed in order to write the constitution 
and consolidate the new democracy.   
The Multi-Industry Framework Agreement (Acuerdo Marco Interconfederal, 
1980-1981) also introduced pay bands (13-16% and 11-15% respectively) as well as 
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including other aspects aimed at greater uniformity in the terms of collective agree-
ments (working time, union rights, overtime and other issues). The National Em-
ployment Agreement, Acuerdo Nacional de Empleo, (1982) also considered wage 
moderation as one of the priorities, so also a pay band (9-11%) was established in or-
der to orientate collective bargaining during a year of strong political uncertainty (the 
failed  coup d’état). In 1983, the Multi-Industry Agreement (Acuerdo Interconfederal) 
followed the same pattern. It established a pay band (9,5%-12,5%) to lead negotia-
tion. And finally, the Socioeconomic Agreement (Acuerdo Económico y Social), 
signed for 1985 and 1986, established a pay band (5,5%-7,5%) to moderate increases 
in wages and, and at the same time, flexibility in contracts was agreed on temporary 
employment. These five pacts spanned the cycle of social concertation and central-
ised wages bargaining. The wage moderation helped to reduce inflation (IPC, con-
sumer price index) which went from almost 30% in 1977 to 8,8% in 1986 (Führer, 
1996: 344-345). 
In the second period, from 1986 to 2001, wage determination has been produced 
without social concertation or tripartite centralised references. The methodology of 
social concertation changed from the 90s: the national level social pacts embracing 
different issues disappeared and the establishment of specific pacts took place. They 
dealt only with certain subjects (such as the Agreement for Extra-judicial Resolution 
of Industrial Conflict, Acuerdos para la Resolución Extrajudicial de Conflictos, and 
the Agreements on Vocational Training, Acuerdos sobre Formación Profesional, 
among others), and also the bipartite instead of the tripartite logic is reinforced. Nev-
ertheless, during this period there was some degree of centralisation, but it was con-
fined to the sectoral agreements. In them, issues such as wage structures were consid-
ered but without establishing the level of incomes (Fina et al. 2001:54). 
During this period, the growth in wages was moderate one due to the strong 
pressure of temporary employment which since 1984 increased to reach around 1/3 of 
all employment during almost all the 90s. While the increase of nominal wages went 
from 6,8% in 1987 to 3,6% in 2000, the IPC went from 5,2% to 3,4% respectively. 
That is to say, behaviour of nominal wages has responded to other variables of the la-
bour market. Some analysts, such as Fina et al. (2001: 131) underline the double ef-
fect of temporary employment. On the one hand, it has reduced the rise of average 
wages. And, on the other side, it has given more protection against dismissal to per-
manent employees. In difficult moments companies make the adjustment through 
workers with a temporary contract. 
Some analysts use the Solow model to try to explain how favourable conditions 
of employment of insiders, and the need of the companies to generate motivation by 
means of the „payment by results”, influence pay rises and inflationary tensions. As a 
result a hysteresis situation takes place: inflationary trends together with structural 
unemployment (suffered by outsiders). This is to say, it is a phenomenon deriving 
from the institutional inflexibility of labour market and from the structure of collec-
tive bargaining itself which prevents employment creation in the sector of low wages 
and non-skilled labour force. However, unions have criticised this interpretation since 
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they think that temporary contracting has the opposite effects to the ones pointed out. 
Temporary employment holds back the strength of unions, their membership and 
their bargaining power.Temporary contracts are also a cause of pay differences. 
Jimeno and Toharia (1993, quoted by Fina et al. 2002: 132), point out that workers 
with temporary contracts get between 9% and 11% lower wages than those with an 
open-ended contract. 
Despite the absence of a centralised policy of wage concertation during these 
years, the clauses of general applicability (erga omnes) have been attributed a ho-
mogenising influence on the behaviour of wages. Their importance seems overstated 
if we consider the actual wage gap between insiders and outsiders, as well as the tar-
gets to be attained by the labour reform of 1994, which tried to mitigate such ho-
mogenising effects by means of  opt-out clauses or by company agreement modifying 
the higher level agreement. Company agreements might be one source of flexibility in 
pay structures. The gap between the agreed and the actual wage, wage drift, is still 
not well documented. In a study at the Universidad de Oviedo (Lorenzo/Felgueroso 
1994, quoted by Fina et al. 2002: 154), wage diversity and the different role of collec-
tive bargaining depending on the activity sector are confirmed. The wage gaps vary 
greatly between sectors, and within the same sector between different occupational 
categories. These gaps refer to the difference between the wage agreed in the collec-
tive agreement and the actual wage which might be an issue to be dealt with in the 
company agreements, or in small groups, or by individual arrangements. The main 
conclusion of this research is that the collective agreement determines the wages of 
the less skilled workers but not of medium and high categories. For example, in 
building, the gap for lower-skilled categories is negligible, at 0,39%. whereas it is 
59,7% for the highly skilled. In the iron and steel sector, the gap is of 10,3% for the 
less-skilled and 79,3% for the more highly skilled. In other words, these gaps con-
tribute to a more flexible wage structure. 
The newest aspect of pay policy has been the trend towards rationalisation and 
simplification of pay structures by means of the reduction in the pay scales, and the 
harmonization of wages by use of broader occupational groups. For employers, the 
purpose of this policy has been to avoid the excessive fragmentation resulting from 
the old system of occupational categories. Changes in technology, in the methods of 
employee management, , , and changes in work organisation have rendered the occu-
pational classification system obsolete. Now, the new pay systems tend to bind wages 
to productivity targets, economic results and quality of production (see table 2). The 
pay structure has been adapting to the technological and organisation changes in the 
companies, that is to say, it has become more flexible, made possible by the so-called 
„pay gaps” (CEOE 2001: 84-86). 
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Tab 2.  Special clauses related to employment in collective agreements  
Number and percentage of affected workers  
(Source: Ministerio de Trabajo y Seguridad Social, Estadísticas de convenios colectivos. 
Data mentioned in the ‘Memoria sobre la situación socioeconómica y laboral’. Madrid: 
publisher Consejo Económico y Social, different years 1997-2001) 
 Clauses 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 
1. Net creation of em-
ployment 
181.332 
(3,0%) 
339.775 
(4,7%) 
380.380 
(5,4%) 
431.270 
(5,5%) 
439.435 
(5,6%) 
2. Employment creation 
for early retirement 
(hand-over contract) 
781.297 
(12,8%) 
1,335.582 
(18,5%) 
1367.221 
(19,6%) 
2106.542 
(27,1%) 
1891.584 
(24,1%) 
3. Preservation of em-
ployment 
300.117 
(4,9%) 
679.935 
(9,4%) 
717.389 
(10,3%) 
502.453 
(5,5%) 
601.315 
(7,7%) 
4. Transformation of 
temporary employment 
into permanent. 
527.422 
(8,6%) 
717.815 
(9,9%) 
1285.056 
(18,4%) 
2031.445 
(26,1%) 
1920.903 
(24,4%) 
5. Other clauses related 
to employment  
2083.976 
(34,1%) 
1834.528 
(25,45%) 
1458.969 
(20,9%) 
1242.047 
(16,0%) 
952.640 
(12,1%) 
6. Maximum number of 
temporary contracts 
- - - - 544.552  
(6,9%) 
7. Use of Temporary 
Employment Agencies 
- - - - 1638.352 
(20,8%) 
8. Geographical mobility 1248.158 
(20,4%) 
1631.269 
(22,6%) 
1566.892 
(22,5%) 
2001.691  
(25,7%) 
 
9. Functional mobility 1283.520 
(21,0%) 
1454.232 
(20,1%) 
1429.612 
(20,5%) 
1504.730 
(19,3%) 
 
10. Clauses related to 
productivity pay  
incentives 
1752.468 
(29,9%) 
2256.811 
(31,9%) 
1794.460 
(25,7%) 
2157.736 
(27,7%) 
2016.500 
(25,7%) 
 
However, the reduction of labour costs has been a key goal. This has been espe-
cially the case in labour intensive activities. The need to improve competitiveness has 
frequently been advanced on the grounds of comparative labour costs in Spain and 
abroad. One strategy has been to make wider use of the so-called ‘two-tier pay scales’ 
which, although legally forbidden, have been possible by means of a sophisticated 
mechanism: notably, through the transformation of seniority benefits into „ad-
personam” pay supplements4 and the hiring young workers without those pay bene-
fits or on lower wages. Consequently, in these cases, new employees are hired on 
                                                          
4  For example, 77% of sectoral agreements and 85% of company agreements include clauses of 
personal supplements (see reports by the CEOE, 2001 and 2002). 
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lower wages (which may be between 20% and 25% lower) than the established staff. 
This two-tier pay scale has two effects. On the one hand, it allows companies to es-
tablish pay planning and progression targets with three or four year time-scale, which 
is an important factor for stability, and planning ahead. And, on the other hand, it 
usually has enabled the transformation of temporary into permanent employment or 
even creation of new jobs. This double character of the two-tier pay scale explains the 
reasons why these clauses, albeit with conflict, have been accepted by unions and 
workers’ committees. 
Pay freezes have been another mechanism used by companies facing crisis and 
in order to guarantee employment in the face of competitive pressures. The labour re-
form of 1994 made if compulsory to include an opt-out clause in sectoral agreements 
although this clause has not been very often used in practice.  
Finally, in 2002, a new centralised pay agreement has been reached. The 
Agreement on Collective Bargaining 2002 has sought to control inflation during the 
establishment of the Single European Currency. The formula fostered by the Euro-
pean Trade Union Confederation in their last conference in Helsinki (predicted IPC + 
productivity) has been adopted and it has been integrated as a clause in the agree-
ments. 
In a few words, and as a summary, we cannot argue that the pay structure re-
mains inflexible, as argued by Bentolila and Jimeno (2002). Nor can we say that it 
generates excessive pay inflation. Clauses in sectoral agreements, and company 
agreements, allow differentiation of wages by means of these „gaps” and they also al-
low a degree of dualism. On the other hand, we can argue to a certain extent that in 
this period, after the reform in 1994, the principle of the autonomy of the parties has 
been reinforced. At the same time, public intervention in collective bargaining is lim-
ited (it is confined to the establishment of the legal framework, and dispute resolu-
tion). 
 Bargaining over working time 
Working time has been a subject of increasing importance in bargaining. Al-
though it is a traditional subject, we have also to consider that its negotiation has 
taken on important new features. In this sense, we may point out four issues related to 
the reduction of working time, its restructuring, reduction of overtime and shift work. 
First, the reduction in annualized working time has followed a moderate down-
wards trend5. Second, another new feature has been the restructuring of working time. 
Indeed, this has been another key element of collective agreements. This variable is 
closely linked to preservation and defence of employment. Restructuring of working 
                                                          
5  Possibly in years when apparently the working time increases (which is a statistic effect de-
riving from the number of agreements registered, the number of workers taken into account 
and the effect of adjustment, see table 3).  
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time is figures in different ways and it is aimed at making the use of labour force 
more flexible in addition to reducing labour costs. In this sense, restructuring of 
working time is presented under different formulae such as annualised working time. 
The Workers’ Statute established the possibility to regulate working time on an an-
nual basis by collective agreement. Another formula to restructure working time con-
sists on its irregular distribution through the year or during the week. Irregular work-
ing time has expanded as a part of the policy to make working time more flexible. 
The legal maximum is 9 hours (see Workers’ Statute, article 39.9), but this may be 
modified by a company agreement (table 3)6. Third, reduction of overtime has been 
an important issue both for employers and unions: for employers, because reduction 
of overtime reduced labour costs; and for unions, because reduction of overtime may 
help to boost employment (remember the motto: less work but work for all). The 
mechanisms by means of which overtime has been reduced (or even eliminated) have 
been, first, their compensation with time off when demand decreases and, second, the 
accumulation of not-worked hours which are held on account. In fact, we may say 
that the amount of overtime for each full time worker has been reducing. However, 
the amount of overtime for workers working them has not fallen (see table 4). This 
may indicate conflicts inside the unions or conflicts between unions and workers’ 
committees, or between unions and workers: on the one side, union’s pressure to re-
duce overtime whereas, on the other hand, committees look to overtime as a supple-
mentary source of income for workers. Fourth, the expansion of shift work (morning-
evening-night and weekends)7 is another new feature of changes in work organisation 
although it started in the 80s. Shift work is closely linked to restructuring and flexi-
bility of working time as well as to the recovery of capital investment. 
                                                          
6  This is an increasing tendency which must be immediately explained in detail according to 
the data in the agreements. Only 7% of agreements have established a limit above 9 hours per 
day. Whereas 38% of the agreements have regulated a maximum of  9 hours per day. Around 
37% of company collective agreements have signed the possibility of irregular working time 
but these working time are only to be applied to staff belonging to concrete sections or de-
partments, and to specific professional levels, categories and groups (CEOE 2001: 51; see 
also report 2002).  
7  Around 35% of collective agreements have shift work clauses. (CEOE 2001: 53). 
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Tab. 3.  Working time agreed in collective agreements  
(Source: Ministerio de Trabajo y Seguridad Social, Estadísticas de convenios colectivos. 
Data mentioned in the ‘Memoria sobre la situación socioeconómica y laboral’. Madrid:: 
Consejo Económico y Social, 2002: 393) 
Years Annual hours Variation in number of hours 
1989 1772,2 - 6,6 
1990 1769,7 - 2,5 
1991 1768,0 - 1,7 
1992 1766,6 - 1,4 
1993 1763,5 - 3,1 
1994 1763,4 -0,1 
1995 1765,9 2,5 
1996 1767,5 1,6 
1997 1767,8 0,3 
1998 1766,6 - 1,2 
1999 1765,0 - 1,6 
2000 1761,7 - 3,3 
2001 1759,3 - 2,4 
 
Tab. 4:  Overtime worked, 1992-2000  
(Source: Ministerio de Trabajo y Seguridad Social, Encuesta de Coyuntura laboral. Data 
mentioned in the ‘Memoria sobre la situación socioeconómica y laboral’. Madrid: Consejo 
Económico y Social, 2001: 399) 
Years Total hours (thousands) Hours per worker  
working them 
Hours per full time 
worker 
1992 64.399,4 98,4 10,5 
1993 49.966,9 95,1 8,8 
1994 53.606,1 95,9 9,7 
1995 57.770,2 100,6 10,3 
1996 64.550,2 107,7 11,5 
1997 71.740,2 124,7 9,7 
1998 67.105,4 108,5 8,5 
1999 57.212,0 101,9 6,8 
2000 58.818,5 100,1 6,7 
 
All in all, the spreading of clauses related to working time in collective agree-
ments is a sign of their increasing heterogeneity. The old model of homogeneous and 
standard taylorist working time is breaking down with three possible consequences: 
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 Crisis in the concept of the working week, which from the 90s, started to be con-
sidered in the context of longer and more irregular cycles, with peak and slack 
periods of work load. 
 A trend towards a modification of working time devoted to leisure and family 
activities which will be probably affected by irregular working time with varia-
tions in the daily and weekly length, by shift work on Saturdays and holidays. Ir-
regularity in working time will increasingly affect synchronization of family and 
working time.  
 Restructuring of working time may mean a threat to the weakest elements in the 
production chain. Subcontracts, Temporary Employment Agencies (ETT) and 
the self-employed may be constrained and force to specialize in working at 
weekends, nights and holidays. Employment in these peripheral areas may be-
come more precarious as argued by other analysts (see, among others, Lallement 
1998; Seifert 1999). 
3.2 New qualitative agenda of negotiation 
The ‘new qualitative agenda’ of bargaining is the result of broadening the range 
issues which are not pay-related. This would seem to indicate that the agenda is being 
enlarged. From the 80s, employers have been interested in introducing new bargain-
ing issues related to the requirements of the new technologies and new forms of work 
organisation such as the structure of occupational categories, internal and geographi-
cal mobility and the non-judicial dispute procedures. Meanwhile unions have been 
struggling to broaden the bargaining agenda with employment matters in which the 
contents have not always been agreed by employers, and neither sometimes by work-
ers’ committees, nor by workers themselves. At present, the most important clauses in 
the qualitative agenda are employment, training contracts, structure of occupational 
classifications, labour health and non-judicial dispute resolution procedures. 
 Employment clauses in collective agreements  
Employment is, undoubtedly, the newest issue8. Including clauses on this subject 
in agreements has been encouraged by the Labour Reform of 1994 and the subse-
quent labour reform of 1997 under the Multi-industry Agreement for Job Stability, 
Acuerdo Interconfederal para la Estabilidad en el Empleo (AIEE). Transformation of 
temporary into permanent employment has been a main concern not only for unions 
but also, to a certain extent, for some large companies because of its effects on con-
sumption and the need to avoid excessive labour turnover. Up to a point, they have 
understood that precariousness and temporary contracts have depressed consumption 
and domestic demand as was seen in the economic crisis from 1991 to 1994. The 
AIEE and the legal measures by the Government have encouraged the transformation 
                                                          
8  In 2000, 42% of agreements included clauses related to employment (CES 2001). 
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of temporary into permanent employment by means of reduced employers’ social se-
curity contributions which has encouraged the rapid spread of these clauses9. How-
ever, the appearance of these clauses in the agreements does not automatically lead to 
a transformation of employment but rather to the recognition of the legal framework 
to be applied and developed inside the company. 
Another clause related to the previous one concerns the limitation of temporary 
contracts in the workplace. Although this clause has not spread very much, it is an in-
novation since it signals a commitment by workers’ committees to avoid precarious 
employment, as it is also established by clauses limiting recourse to Temporary Em-
ployment Agencies (above mentioned). Other clauses refer to creating employment as 
a result of early retirements although they are not very widely applied, and with the 
clauses for job protection and the creation of employment. 
 Training contracts 
Clauses related to training and work experience have been introduced in collective 
agreements under a labour law which encourages the use of these clauses. This law con-
siders two kinds of contracts: training contracts and work-experience contracts. 
Thus, first, in the development of collective bargaining, there has been a ten-
dency towards increased use of training contracts although this may also be a result of 
the law. In fact, some analysts argue that the use of this power given to negotiators by 
law is very low. The „training contracts” replace the old apprenticeship contracts. 
This contractual form, established by law (Royal Decree 488/1998), sets the power to 
decide the maximum number of contracts in relation to the number of employees in 
the company. In this sense, there is a tendency to define which the jobs and categories 
are subject to this contractual form, with a duration of between two and three years. 
This contract is aimed at young workers aged between 16 and 21. 
Second, work-experience contracts are determined by the negotiating parties 
themselves. Article 11.1 of the Workers’ Statute empowers the parties to determine 
the jobs, levels and occupational categories to which this kind of contract may apply. 
The duration of these contracts runs from 6 months to 2 years, with pay between 60% 
and 70% of that for workers in the same or similar jobs. Not only have clauses related 
to these contracts have been increasing, but also it has been the way by which some 
large companies have sought to rejuvenate their workforces. A large number of 
young workers have been recruited onto with work-experience contracts or even 
training contracts and, at the same time, corresponding numbers of older employees 
have been offered early retirement. 
Clauses related concretely to training have also spread in collective agreements, 
under the auspices of the National Agreements on Vocational Training, and the 
                                                          
9  These clauses have gone from 8,6% in 1996 to 26,1% of agreements in 1999 and down to 
24,4% of agreements in 2000. See table 2. 
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Agreement on Continuing Training. In contrast, linking training and occupational ad-
vancement is not very common. 
 Labour health  
The big increase in the number of industrial accidents has led to a number of re-
lated clauses being included in collective agreements. Likewise, development of Act 
3/1995 on Safety at Work , Ley de Prevención de Riesgos Laborales, has boosted 
clauses related to safety. 
Safety at work and prevention of accidents more and more often appear in the 
agreements. However, agreements generally also usually refer to these laws which is 
an indication of the lack of fit between this law and sectoral and company practice. 
Nevertheless, these clauses related to safety at work and prevention of accidents are 
more important in company agreements than in sectoral ones.10 
 Structure of occupational classifications and mobility 
The tendency to include bargaining over occupational classifications is related to 
the process of organisational and technological modernisation in companies. In this 
sense, the new clauses refer to the establishment of occupational groups as the core 
for occupational classification. Companies and the CEOE, in particular, support in-
troducing the concept of new occupational groups because they make functional mo-
bility easier among workers who are included in those groups. Functional and geo-
graphical mobility has also spread in collective agreements, although, in many cases, 
the clauses merely reproduce what has already been established in the Workers’ Stat-
ute (CEOE 2002).11 
However, appearance of clauses related to external flexibility is indeed new and 
a concern for unions. In this sense, in recent years, clauses have been appearing 
which are aimed at restricting outsourcing.  
 Extra-judicial dispute resolution procedures 
The Workers’ Statute contained provisions for developing mechanisms and in-
stitutions for extra-judicial dispute resolution in industrial conflicts. However, agree-
ments to create those institutions have been reached fairly recently. On 25th January 
1996, the unions, CCOO and UGT, as well as the employers’ organisations, CEOE 
and CEPYME, signed an agreement to start the Agreement on Extra-judicial Solution 
                                                          
10  Around 78% of collective agreements in 2000 had clauses on labour health. Clauses on labour 
health appear in 86% of company collective agreements whereas they appear in just 60% of 
sectoral agreements. (CEOE 2001: 144). 
11  Occupational Classification based on occupational categories is still in 35% of collective 
agreements whereas there is a majority of them which consider group and category classifica-
tion at the same time.  
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of Industrial Conflict (ASEC) with validity for 5 years and which was extended for 
five more years in 2000. 
ASEC envisages five kinds of industrial conflict which can be resolved and lead 
to agreement: 
1. disagreements related to the interpretation and application of a collective agree-
ment, agreement or collective pact; 
2. Industrial conflict after a breakdown of negotiations. 
3. Negotiations which have been blocked for more than six months; 
4. Industrial conflict resulting in strike call or resulting from setting the security 
and maintenance services once the strike has been called; and 
5. Industrial conflict during the consultation period before moving, essential 
modification in working conditions, collective suspension of contracts due to 
technical, economic, organisation or production reasons and collective dis-
missal (table 5 and 6).12 
Tab. 5: Industrial conflicts. Main strike indicators, 1991-2000  
(Source: Ministerio de Trabajo y Seguridad Social, Boletín de Estadísticas LaboralesData 
mentioned in the ‘Memoria sobre la situación socioeconómica y laboral’. Madrid: Consejo 
Económico y Social, 2001: 446) 
Years Number of 
strikes 
Total par-
ticipants 
(thousands)
Participants 
per strike 
Total not 
worked 
working days 
(thousands) 
Not worked 
working 
days per 
strike 
Not worked 
working 
days per 
participant.
1991 1552 1945 1253 4421 2489 2,3 
1992 1296 5170 3989 6247 4820 1,2 
1993 1131 997 882 2013 1780 2,0 
1994 890 5428 6099 6255 7028 1,2 
1995 866 570 658 1443 1666 2,5 
1996 807 1078 1336 1553 1924 1,4 
1997 709 631 890 1790 2525 2,8 
1998 618 672 1087 1264 2044 1,8 
1999 739 1125 1522 1477 1999 1,3 
2000 626 1873 2992 3088 4933 1,6 
                                                          
12  Industrial conflict seems to have increased since the late 90s. Not due to the number of strikes 
but to the increase of strike participants and the increase of not worked working days. These 
variables indicate that strikes have been affecting important sectors of activity during the last 
years such as building (for prevention of labour risks reasons in 2000) and transport among 
others (see table 5). This is to say, they are specific industrial conflicts and strike callings. We 
have to add the General Strike on June 20th 2002 claiming against the rupture of social dia-
logue and the reform of unemployment benefits.  
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Tab. 6: Lock-out  
(Source: Memoria sobre la situación socioeconómica y laboral. Madrid: CES: 450) 
Year Number of lock-outs Workers affected Not-worked working days 
1991 93 39.320 115.264 
1992 64 22.492 86.029 
1993 78 79.554 128.694 
1994 18 9.734 21.991 
1995 17 3.554 14.155 
1996 23 9.765 26.786 
1997 35 19.644 46.674 
1998 14 8.631 17.342 
1999 10 7.599 27.085 
2000 16 5.511 38.897 
 
The ASEC established the Multi-Industry Mediation and Arbitration Service, 
Servicio Interconfederal Mediación y Arbitraje (SIMA). From 1997, when it was cre-
ated, SIMA has dealt with an increasing the number of industrial conflicts. These are 
mostly at company level. The conflicts concern mainly issues of interpretation and 
application of the collective agreement and industrial conflict related to strike call 
whereas industrial conflict deriving from the negotiation of collective agreements is 
very unusual. However, it has to be said that the unions may call strikes in order to 
speed up the proceedings of SIMA. The mediation procedures reinforce the autono-
mous solution of labour conflicts. Use of arbitration has been of little interest to the 
parties. Clauses to use services of the SIMA have spread remarkably quickly.13  
4.  Assessment of labour reforms and their effects on collective bargaining 
The collective bargaining reforms of 1994 and 1997 encouraged a new dyna-
mism. We may say that the new issues covered have contributed to an enlargement of 
negotiation agendas, whereas procedural changes have contributed to decentralisation 
and to make collective bargaining more flexible. 
4.1 Expanding the range of issues covered by agreement 
In this connection, we highlight different items such as  
a)  the tendency towards flexibility of the pay structure and the tendency towards its 
dualism.  
                                                          
13  Clauses on extra-judicial solution of industrial conflict appear in 60% of sectoral agreements 
and in 34% of company collective agreements (CEOE 2001: 131). 
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b)  the increasing diversification of working time and its irregular distribution 
throughout the year are also a sign of the flexibility;  
c)  introduction of clauses about the creation of new occupational groups to replace 
the old system of occupational classification and the „labour ordinances” are 
also a sign of the adaptation of agreements to organisational and technological 
modernisation at company level as well as the new methods of company man-
agement;  
d)  clauses on internal flexibility show how internal mobility and polyvalence are 
part of the above mentioned process of company modernisation;  
e)  however, introduction of clauses related to external flexibility, limiting the use 
of subcontracts or ETT to cover certain jobs, show the pressure made by unions 
to avoid degradation of working conditions; and  
f)  the inclusion of clauses on extra-judicial dispute resolution procedures disputes 
shows the functional role of unions which relates both to industrial conflict and 
to industrial governance. 
4.2 Changes in procedure: decentralisation of agreements 
In addition to the changes in the content of collective bargaining there have been 
procedural changes. Two such changes concern the extension of agreements and the 
decentralisation of bargaining. ‘Extension of agreements refers to their automatic ex-
tension in time once the expiration date passes and until a new agreement. A related 
problem is that clauses are often carried forward from one agreement to the following 
one. Employers and the government have urged a fresh start on this issue when a col-
lective agreement expires. That is, each negotiation should begin with a discussion of 
all clauses afresh without considering what was agreed in previous years. However, 
we have to make two remarks: a) the first is that data on agreements show an increase 
in the duration of agreements, at present, the average time they remain in force is 
about 30 months which is seen by the CEOE itself (2002) as benefiting companies 
because the agreement allows them to plan and predict labour management over a 
longer period; b) starting each negotiation from scratch is a source of instability, and 
of industrial conflict. It is also a liberal utopia because it forgets that social partners, 
workers’ committees and unions, are also historical subjects, engaged in the struggle 
for better living and working conditions. 
As far as decentralisation of collective bargaining is concerned, we have to say 
that this process has passed unrecorded in official statistics. Nevertheless, it exists. In 
this sense, the most important procedure refers to some changes in sectoral agree-
ments which establish opening clauses for subsequent negotiation at lower levels. 
This leads to a growth of company agreements or pacts which are not recorded com-
pulsorily. According to experts, these company agreements have also spread under 
the labour reforms in 1994 and 1997. To a certain extent, these agreements have in-
troduced changes in collective bargaining which might be summarised under four 
headings (Garcia Murcia et al. 1997). 
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First, decentralisation of collective bargaining has been a source of company 
pacts and agreements. The sectoral (and even company) collective agreement may be 
used as a framework but it is possible that the new dynamic of decentralisation 
(where the concrete aspects of substantial rules or contents of agreements are devel-
oped) is increasingly taking place through company or workplace pacts. In this sense, 
pacts adapt to what has been called „company-oriented” industrial relations. 
Secondly, these agreements introduce a new dynamism so that the negotiation 
process becomes continuous, related to everyday life, and not just to a concrete time 
period as it happened with the traditional agreements. Now, this new concept of ne-
gotiating process results in creating joint committees in which issues such as produc-
tivity, work organisation, labour health, and employment and so on are discussed. 
Agreements or pacts on concrete issues are constantly proposed in these committees. 
In this sense, the new dynamism of negotiation means more participation but also a 
more invisible and vague aspect since there is no register of these pacts. 
Third, pacts are associated with changes in work organisation and introduction 
of new technologies. The pact is also a part of a ritual to legitimize change and obtain 
workers’ consent. Such pacts even include the improvement of the company’s image 
in its social environment as a purpose. It is a way to obtain bigger social legitimacy 
when these pacts come with clauses about employment (Martín Artiles/Jodar 1999). 
Fourth, company pacts or agreements may have a commitment to improve com-
petitiveness, specially binding employment with restructuring of working time. Some 
authors defined this kind of agreements as „concession bargaining”, what reflects the 
idea of winners and losers (Sisson 2000). Others refer to „competitive bargaining” in 
the sense of a micro-corporatist logic which makes articulation of different levels of 
negotiation problematic (Regini 2000). This micro-corporatist logic may make the 
alignment of collective bargaining and macroeconomic policy more difficult. If so, it 
would result be paradoxical because the government and some official institutions 
claim decentralisation is a way to aligning wages with the targets just mentioned, but 
decentralisation may also be a source of lack of discipline, and micro-conflict. 
In addition to the decentralisation of collective bargaining by means of company 
agreements, there is a problem of fragmentation of collective agreements stressed by 
some analysts. A fragmentation of collective agreements seems indeed to be happen-
ing. This may be understood as a readjustment of agreements to take account of the 
new characteristics of network companies. Some analysts indeed find a restructuring 
in the levels of collective bargaining derive from the subcontracting processes. Merg-
ers, capital concentration and fragmentation processes in the organisation of produc-
tion seem to result in the rupture of already existing collective agreements, and at the 
same time, they generate gaps in labour protection. A sign of this process is the re-
definition of activities as a consequence of mergers or subcontracting which can 
sometimes result in fragmentation of sectoral agreements. In other cases, industrial 
groups and related companies in a network force a redefinition of new bargaining 
levels. Likewise, the liberalisation processes in the public sector brings the birth of 
new and different companies which sometimes leave important groups of workers 
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outside the coverage of the collective agreement. In a few words, redefinition of func-
tional levels in collective agreements is gradually becoming more complex (CCOO 
2002: 20-21).  
4.3 Project of reform of collective bargaining. 
In the project to reform collective bargaining presented by the Government there 
is a convergence of social partners on one point: simplification of the structure, dis-
tinguishing the national sectoral level and the company level. In fact, this conver-
gence was already stated in the introduction of the Multi-industry Agreement for Col-
lective Bargaining (AINC) from 1997 where it was clear that the aim was to „con-
tribute to the formation of  a new system of collective agreement better than the exist-
ing one.” The purpose was to achieve a system of articulated bargaining taking the 
national sectoral level as the predominant unit of negotiation. Likewise, its aim was 
to build an articulated model between the national sectoral, the territorial sectoral, and 
the company levels. However, the final purpose was not to build a single model for 
all sectors but to establish patterns for those issues which were reserved for the na-
tional sectoral agreement (issues which are to be directly applied at lower levels) and 
other issues requiring negotiation as lower levels (Consejo Económico y Social, 
2002). 
In this regard, clauses have gradually been introduced into collective agreements 
which are aimed at promoting articulation between levels and framework agreements. 
That is to say, a more important ‘steering column’ has been sought linking the differ-
ent negotiation units. At present, we may say that evolution of collective bargaining 
in recent years has followed a dual tendency (see table 7). On the one hand, it has 
been towards decentralisation by means of company agreements (complementary to 
collective agreements) which have not been legally registered and, therefore, which 
do not appear in statistical data. On the other hand, there has been a decentralisation 
process that can be observed from the signing of new national sectoral agreements 
and from the reduction in levels of local and regional sectoral agreements.    
However, still at present there remains a discrepancy between the social partners 
about the kind of articulation and the content of the issues to be negotiated in each 
level which resulted, in 2001, in the failed attempt to reform the structure of collec-
tive bargaining. The point of conflict concerns the centralisation or decentralisation 
of collective bargaining, and it has two different components. 
a)  On the one hand, employers and government favour decentralisation, the rein-
forcing the bargaining levels from the lowest, in companies and workplaces, to 
enable agreements to reflect the concrete economic situation in each company 
but also to give room to respond to market conditions. Employers’ organisations 
seem to be less interested in coordinating their bargaining activities. The CEOE-
CEPYME favours reducing the role of regulation and a centralised decision in 
favour of more autonomy at lower levels. This is consistent with the „organisa-
tional minimalism” which, according to Lanzalaco (1995), is a feature of em-
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ployers’ organisations. The metaphor of „organisational minimalism” shows a 
desire by employers to avoid being restricted by pacts or agreements at higher 
levels outside the company.  
Tab. 7: Collective Bargaining structure and levels  
(Source: Available data are for years 1994 and 2000 and they have been published in CES 
(1995); Memoria sobre la situación socioeconómica y laboral. Madrid: 4; CES (2001). 
Memoria sobre la situación socioeconómica y laboral. Madrid: 450) 
 Number of  
agreements 
Companies Workers 
 1994 2000 1994 2000 1994 2000 
Company  
agreements 
2.309 2.899 2.309 3.049 688.491 902.874 
Sectoral 
provincial 
772 932 478.818 678.592 3.006.613 4.115.887 
Sectoral local 17 14 754 622 6.741 5.112 
Sector inter 
provincial 
25 29 37.663 76.011 481.208 572.958 
Sectoral 
autonomic 
- 28 - 75.716 - 571.441 
Sectoral inter  
autonomic 
- 1 - 295 - 1.515 
Sectoral national 43 71 98.011 219.052 991.117 2.265.983 
Total 3.192 3.946 617.623 977.326 5.184.294 7.862.814 
 
b)  On the other hand, the trade unions favour centralisation of collective agree-
ments. In fact, they are the ones who strive hardest to coordinate their bargaining 
activities.  But they also have difficulties in coordinating union action at micro 
and macro levels. Evidence of this is the spread of company and workplace 
agreements which respond to the concrete situations of particular groups of 
workers. Many of these agreements are reached without considering, or even 
against, union policy. This coordination problem of action between the micro 
and macro levels generates conflict within the union which sometimes results in 
conflict between workers’ committees (representative body for all workers) and 
trade unions. This is an old problem already described in the literature and called 
„parallel unionism” of workers’ committees. 
Decentralisation, and the kind of unionism resulting from it, bring three poten-
tial risks. The first, of parallel unionism is the difficulty of articulating the workers’ 
interests and higher level social dialogue. The second risk is micro industrial conflict, 
the extension of industrial conflict and its intermittent and uncontrollable character. 
And the third risk is that fragmentation among grass roots representatives enables the 
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development of individualised labour management practices. In fact, these micro-
corporatist practices seem to contribute to labour fragmentation. 
But they also bring opportunities because the decentralisation of collective bar-
gaining may reinforce the predominant role and participation of workers and their 
representatives at workplace  level. Decentralisation may increase the participation 
among workers, union delegates and workers’ committees in decision processes, and 
broaden the influence of workers’ representatives on some issues and decision proc-
esses, and reinforce the ideological identification between representatives and work-
ers, and even to improve legitimization of unions. Decentralisation of collective bar-
gaining may mean sharing some microeconomic responsibility by workers’ represen-
tatives and workers’ committees, and it may even add a good deal of realism and joint 
responsibility to face the economic situation of the company, which would help com-
panies to adapt to their changing environment. 
On the other hand, we have also to consider the large number of very small 
firms in Spain. In resent years this has increased as a result of production decentrali-
sation and subcontracting. The widespread fragmentation of companies discourages 
the establishment of local workers’ representatives and makes the union presence and 
intervention difficult. Consequently, the unions consider that extreme decentralisation 
of collective bargaining would leave a large number of workers outside the coverage 
of collective agreements, so they demand sectoral agreements, of national or lower 
levels which can cover workers in these firms. 
5. Conclusions 
If we take again the thread used as a guideline for this special issue of the jour-
nal, we may conclude on four points which have already been examined and consid-
ered in this article. They are the impact of legal changes on industrial relations, the 
socioeconomic effects of collective bargaining, articulation of the bargaining levels 
as well as the coverage and legitimacy of collective bargaining. 
1. The impact of legal changes on industrial relations. The labour reforms of 
1994, first, and the subsequent labour reform of 1997 boosted the decentralisation of 
collective bargaining and also enriched its contents. 
As far as structure of collective bargaining is concerned, the 1994 reform facili-
tated decentralisation by means of the company agreements. The AINC in 1997 
helped to rationalise the structure of collective bargaining. We can deduce that legal 
reforms helped to rationalise the structure of collective bargaining in two ways: on 
the one hand, they reinforced the tendency towards decentralisation; on the other, 
they fostered a centralising process which may be seen in the reduction of local and 
regional bargaining units. If we also consider as a part of the centralising process the 
formulation of social concertation pacts (Toledo Pacts for the Reform of Pensions, 
Agreements on Extra-judicial Solution of Industrial Conflict, Agreement on Collec-
tive Bargaining 2002 and others), we may say that we are actually witnessing a dual 
process, in which centralisation and decentralisation are two features of the trend in 
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industrial relations. These two processes do not appear to be contradictory and they 
may even be complementary. 
As far as content of collective bargaining is concerned, reforms have enabled the 
introduction of new clauses which attempt to respond to the demands of organisa-
tional and technological modernisation in companies, as well as to the demands of the 
partners themselves. Issues such as employment, productivity, internal and geo-
graphical mobility, reform of occupational classifications, labour health and clauses 
on extra-judicial dispute resolution, among others, have been included in the new ne-
gotiating agenda. The traditional bargaining issues, such as pay, have also been modi-
fied. Pay structure shows a tendency towards dualism and flexibility. The high rate of 
temporary employment in the 90s contributed to wage dispersion as did the opening 
of „wage gaps”. Wage gaps introduce an element of flexibility into the pay structure 
by means of a difference between collectively agreed and actual earnings. Neverthe-
less, some analysts still consider this divergence to be insufficient. In contrast, re-
structuring of working time has indeed occurred and this important source of flexibil-
ity has been more clearly acknowledged by different scholars. In fact, there is a 
strong relationship between clauses on pay, working time and employment in collec-
tive agreements. 
2. Socioeconomic effects of collective bargaining. Social concertation played a 
crucial role in controlling inflationary pressures from 1978 to 1986, with a dramatic 
reduction from around 30% to 8,8% over the period. Besides the economic function 
of controlling inflation by means of wage moderation, social concertation had a po-
litical function to consolidate Spanish democracy. Likewise, social concertation has 
been a basic source of consensual procedural rules for the system of industrial rela-
tions itself. 
In the period 1987-2001, inflationary pressures reduced and this has enabled the 
control of inflation by means of collective agreements without having to resort to 
centralised concertation. Possibly, the high percentage of temporary employment 
contracts, which were introduced in 1994, has also slowed down pay growth which 
may explain its moderate behaviour for a long period of time. 
Probably the Stability Pact, Pacto de Estabilidad, deriving from the Maastricht 
Treaty, has given stability in wage matters. Even in the period of strong employment 
growth, between 1995 and 2001, wages displayed only a moderate rise. However, 
with the establishment of the Euro, again concertation has had to be used: the Agree-
ment for Collective Bargaining 2002 seeks to moderate the rise of wages in order to 
make the introduction of the new currency easier. 
3. Changes and relation between negotiation levels. Articulation and coordina-
tion of collective bargaining levels is still a problem despite the reforms. The struc-
ture of collective bargaining is still fragmented into sectoral, sectoral-provincial, re-
gional, local and company levels. The debate about reform is still open. At present, 
there is only consensus between social partners over the simplification of collective 
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bargaining. This is the establishment of two levels: a sectoral national and a company 
level. There is disagreement as to the attributions and contents assigned to each level. 
4. Legitimacy and coverage of collective bargaining. The coverage of collective 
bargaining is still wide (around 80%) as a result of the erga omnes system. Maybe, 
this clause contributes to the effectiveness of agreements on wage issues thus con-
tributing stability to industrial relations as was argued at the beginning of this paper.  
For some analysts (Banco de España, Bentolila and Jimeno 2002) the wide cov-
erage of the collective bargaining has homogenising effects on wage performance 
which is seen as a source of rigidity and makes employment creation difficult in the 
low wage sectors and for unskilled manpower. The coverage of collective bargaining 
and the inflexibility of the pay structure are the causes of structural unemployment, or 
all the same, unemployment has institutional reasons. This argument, advanced  by 
the public authorities caused them to insist on the need to reform collective bargain-
ing despite the reforms already made in 1994 and 1997. 
Both reforms have encouraged a dual process, of centralisation and decentralisa-
tion which apparently has contributed to greater legitimacy for collective bargaining. 
However, the legitimacy may finally be found in the effectiveness of collective bar-
gaining itself. This effectiveness may be the result of enlarging the content of collec-
tive agreements by the introduction of the new agenda and particularly of employ-
ment as a bargaining issue (notably with the transformation of temporary into perma-
nent employment and under the coverage of the AIEE). But the fundamental problem 
of legitimacy for collective bargaining and for unions may depend on how they tackle 
the important problem of labour market dualism. During the 90s, one third of workers 
had and still had temporary employment contracts with lower wages than workers on 
open-ended contracts. Temporary employment inhibits the bargaining power of un-
ions and it also slows down union membership growth. 
Legitimacy and effectiveness are matters of policy which may not prevent the 
growth of micro-corporatism, the prevalence of parallel unionism in workers’ com-
mittees and emergence of new para-unionist groups encouraged by decentralisation of 
collective bargaining. However, the dual process of decentralisation and centralisa-
tion may reinforced the legitimacy of collective bargaining: decentralisation, because 
it allows collective bargaining to respond to the concrete situations and conditions of 
individual workplaces; and centralisation, because it timidly allows the introduction 
of principles of coordination, articulation and rationalisation which might be aligned 
with the targets of macroeconomic policy.      
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Tab 8: Main social concertation agreements in recent years 
Agreement Signatories Aim Date of  
signature 
Validity Observations 
Acuerdo Nacional 
sobre Formación 
Continua (ANFC) 
National Agreement 
on Continuing Train-
ing 
CEOE, 
CEPYME, 
UGT, CCOO 
and CIG joins 
it 
Unions and em-
ployers’ organisa-
tions decide to 
jointly assume 
and manage pro-
fessional training 
December 
1992 
1993-
1996 
Later an agree-
ment is signed 
with the Govern-
ment to create the 
‘Fundación para la 
Formación Con-
tinua’ FORCEM 
Foundation for 
continuing train-
ing 
Acuerdo Interconfed-
eral en materia de 
Ordenanzas y  
Reglamentaciones de 
Trabajo (AIOR)  
Multi-industry 
agreement in issues 
of labour ordinances 
and regulations 
CEOE, 
CEPYME, 
UGT and 
CCOO 
Substitution of 
old regulations 
for collective 
agreements  
October 
1994 
  
Acuerdo sobre 
Solución Extrajudi-
cial de Conflictos 
(ASEC) 
Agreement on Extra-
judicial Solution of 
the Industrial Con-
flict 
CEOE, 
CEPYME, 
UGT, CCOO 
To institutionalise 
the solution of  
abour industrial 
conflict outside 
court. 
June 1996 1997-
2000 
Later agreement 
with the Govern-
ment to create the  
‘Servicio Intercon-
federal de Media-
ción y Arbitraje’ 
Multi-industry 
Service of Media-
tion and Arbitra-
tion 
Acuerdo sobre desar-
rollo de la Ley de 
Prevención de Ries-
gos Laborales 
Agreement on the de-
velopment of the Pre-
vention of Labour 
Risks Act 
CEOE, UGT, 
CCOO and 
Government 
To develop the 
Labour Risks Act
June 1996   
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Acuerdo sobre Con-
solidación y Racion-
alización del Sistema 
de Seguridad Social 
Agreement on Con-
solidation and Ra-
tionalisation of the 
Social Security Sys-
tem 
CCOO, UGT 
and Govern-
ment 
Modification of 
the public system 
of pensions 
October 
1996 
  
II Acuerdo Nacional 
sobre Formación 
Continua (ANFC) 
2nd National  Agree-
ment on  Continuing 
Training 
CEOE, 
CEPYME, 
UGT, CCOO 
The same aims as 
the previous 
ANFC 
December 
1996 
1997-
2000 
Later agreement 
with the Govern-
ment 
Acuerdo Interconfed-
eral para la Estabili-
dad en el Empleo 
(AIEE) 
Multi-industry –
Agreement on Job 
Stability 
CEOE, 
CEPYME, 
UGT, CCOO 
Job stability cre-
ating a new mo-
dality of open-
ended contract to 
promote em-
ployment with 
reduced compen-
sation in case of 
unjustified dis-
missal 
April 1997 1997-
2001 
Later agreement 
with the Govern-
ment to adapt it to 
law 
Acuerdo Interconfed-
eral sobre Negocia-
ción Colectiva 
(AINC) 
Multi-industry 
Agreement on Collec-
tive Bargaining 
CEOE, 
CEPYME, 
UGT, CCOO 
It attempts to or-
ganise and articu-
late the structure 
of collective bar-
gaining 
April 1997 1997-
2001 
 
Acuerdo Interconfed-
eral de Cobertura de 
Vacíos (AICV) 
Multi-industry 
Agreement on Cover-
age of Legal Voids 
CEOE, 
CEPYME, 
UGT, CCOO 
Regulation of 
working condi-
tions in sectors 
not covered by 
collective bar-
gaining 
April 1997 1997-
2001 
 
Acuerdo sobre el 
Trabajo a Tiempo 
Parcial 
Agreement on Part-
time Work 
CCOO, UGT 
and Govern-
ment 
New regulation 
of part-time con-
tracts 
November 
1998 
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III Acuerdo Nacional 
sobre Formación 
Continua (ANCF) 
3rd National  Agree-
ment on  Continuing 
Training 
CEOE, 
CEPYME, 
UGT, CCOO 
and CIG 
The same aims as 
the previous 
ANCF 
December 
2000 
2001-
2004 
Agreement with 
the Government to 
create the ‘Fun-
dación Tripartita 
para la Formación 
Profesional en el 
Empleo’ Tripartite 
Foundation for 
Professional 
Training in the 
employment 
II Acuerdo sobre 
Solución Extrajudi-
cial de Conflictos 
(ASEC) 
 2nd Agreement on 
Extra-judicial Solu-
tion of the Industrial 
Conflict 
CEOE, 
CEPYME, 
UGT, CCOO 
The same aims as 
the previous 
ASEC 
January 
2001 
2001-
2004 
Later agreement 
with the Govern-
ment to running of  
‘Servicio Intercon-
federal de Media-
ción y Arbitraje’ 
Multi-industry 
Service of Media-
tion and Arbitra-
tion 
Acuerdo para la Me-
jora y Desarrollo del 
Sistema de Seguridad 
Social 
Agreement on the Im-
provement and De-
velopment of the So-
cial Security System 
CEOE, 
CEPYME, 
CCOO and 
Government 
On the system of 
pensions and so-
cial protection 
and its financing. 
April 2001 2001-
2004 
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